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ALL POWER TO THE JURY-CALIFORNIA'S
DEMOCRATIC EVIDENCE CODE
by Otto M. Kaus*
In another article in this issue, my friend Ken Graham claims that
the California Evidence Code is establishment oriented. I will not
argue the point whether, taken as a whole, the Code's predominant ap-
peal is to our social, political and economic aristocracy. I do maintain,
however, that if it is an exercise in democracy to deprive judges of some
of their traditional powers and to place those powers into the hands
of lay juries, Professor Graham is at least partly wrong.
I
The admissibility of evidence often depends on some preliminary
fact being found true. Frequently the finding must be based on con-
flicting evidence. The orthodox rule with respect to the allocation of
such fact finding functions between court and jury was stated by Mor-
gan: "[w]here the relevancy of A depends upon the existence of B, the
existence of B should normally be for the jury; where the competency
of A depends upon the existence of B, the existence of B should always
be for the judge."'- In other words, if the evidence is relevant, but its
competency under a technical rule of admissibility depends on proof of
some other fact-such as the legality of an arrest, the loss of a letter,
criminal purpose in seeking legal advice or the unavailability of a
hearsay declarant-the existence or nonexistence of that fact is deter-
mined, with finality, by the court. While there are times when reason-
able men may differ whether a particular preliminary fact determines
relevance or competency,2 in the vast majority of situations the ortho-
dox rule, if understood, is easily applied. The California Evidence
* Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Divi-
sion Five; Lecturer in Law, Loyola University of Los Angeles.
I Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Ques-
tions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. RE'V. 165, 169 (1929); see also Maguire & Epstein, Pre-
liminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARv. L.
REv. 392 (1927).
Competency, as that term is used in this article, does not mean personal knowledge
or ability to relate. It is used as the antonym of "incompetency": inadmissibility under
a technical rule of evidence (e.g. hearsay or privilege).
2 See note 40 infra.
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Code has made a commendable and nearly successful effort to struc-
ture California law along orthodox lines.3 The conversion was long
overdue. No California opinion of which I am aware had enunciated
a general principle, orthodox or heretical, that could be applied to
newly encountered situations with any assurance. Thus pre-Code case
law had entrusted the preliminary fact finding function in cases of con-
fessions,4 dying declarations,5 and spontaneous statements to both the
court and the jury. On the other hand the job of finding the founda-
tional facts, which the proponent of co-conspirators' statements has to
prove, was entrusted entirely to the jury;7 it was immaterial that the
court was satisfied that the foundational evidence was a bag of lies. All
it could do was to instruct the jury that it should not consider the co-
conspirators' statements if it, in turn, found the foundation to be want-
ing.
8
3 This is largely contained in §§ 400-06 of the Code. Henceforth all statutory ref-
erences, unless otherwise noted, are to the Evidence Code.
4 People v. Gonzales, 24 Cal. 2d 870, 876-77, 151 P.2d 251, 254-55 (1944).
5 People v. Singh, 182 Cal. 457, 476, 188 P. 987, 995 (1920).
6 People v. Keelin, 136 Cal. App. 2d 860, 871-72, 289 P.2d 520, 527-28 (1955).
7 People v. Steccone, 36 Cal. 2d 234, 238, 223 P.2d 17, 20 (1950). The only function
performed by the court was the determination whether there is evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the foundational facts exist; in other words, whether the proponent
has made out a prima facie case.
8 Giving such an instruction correctly can be quite tricky. Suppose the defendant is
on trial for conspiracy and statements of alleged co-conspirators have been provision-
ally admitted. The court must then, in effect, tell the jury that it may only consider the
statements against the defendant if it has first determined that he is guilty of the crime
charged. Of course, I assume that the preliminary determination can be made on a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, while the final one is governed by the reasonable doubt
standard. Asking a lay jury to walk so fine a line is, by itself, a good reason for not en-
trusting the job to it in the first place. In United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.
1950), which was a conspiracy prosecution under the Smith Act, the trial judge really
did instruct that co-conspirators' statements could only be considered if the jury was first
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were parties to the conspiracy.
The appellate court, speaking through Judge Learned Hand, correctly observed that this
instruction gave the defendants more than they had a right to ask for. It also correctly
noted that:
Tihe better doctrine is that the judge is always to decide, as concededly he gen-
erally must; any issues of fact on which the competence of evidence depends, and
that, if he decides it to be competent, he is to leave it to the jury to use like any
other evidence, without instructing them to consider it as proof only after they
too have decided a preliminary issue which alone makes it competent. Indeed,
it is a practical impossibility for laymen, and for that matter for most judges, to
keep their minds in the isolated compartments that this requires. Id. at 231.
In Dennis the defendants had asked that the matter of the admissibility of the statements
be left to the jury. The court therefore did not have to discuss a problem which in-
evitably arises when it permits a jury to disregard evidence: did the court actually do
its job of fact finding, or did it pass the buck?
1971] CALIFORNIA'S DEMOCRATIC EVIDENCE CODE 235
For reasons which I do not understand the California Law Revision
Commission retained at least one of the former heresies9 and came
up with a few of its own.
To be specific, the Code and its comments place into the hands of the
jury the determination of the identity of the speaker where the admissi-
bility of a hearsay statement depends on the speaker being a particular
person, and of an agent's authority to make an admission on behalf of
a principal. It also gives to the jury the determination of all prelimi-
nary facts in the case of an adoptive admission and the pre-Code rule
with respect to co-conspirators' statements is retained. In all these situ-
ations the hearsay statement must be conditionally received-and there-
fore heard by te jury-on a mere prima facie showing of admissibility,
regardless of whether the court thinks that the showing is credible.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the Commission's
departures from the orthodox rule are not supported by its own reason-
ing and authorities.' ° Further, I shall suggest an argument why one of
the departures may be unconstitutional in criminal cases.
II
The Commission's heresies relate entirely to foundational facts which
make some hearsay" admissible. They are contained in section 403
9 I refer to § 1223, which did not change prior case law with respect to co-con-
spirators' statements. That section reads as follows:
Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if:
(a) The statement was made by the declarant while participating in a con-
spiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objec-
tive of that conspiracy;
(b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that the party was
participating in that conspiracy; and
(c) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence sufficient to sus-
tain a finding of the facts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in the
court's discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the admission of such
evidence.
Section 1223(a) is based on former CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1848 and § 1223(b) is
essentially a restatement of former CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. § 1870(6) as interpreted by
case law. It is to be noted that the wording of the section precludes application of
the rule of Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) that the
wrongful nature of the conspiracy may be proved by the statements themselves. For
a comprehensive discussion of this exception to the hearsay rule, see Levie, Hearsay and
Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1159 (1954).
10 No particular effort will be made to justify the wisdom of the orthodox rule. I
have nothing to add to the compelling arguments made by Morgan and Maguire. See
note 1 supra.
11 As a personal confession, I feel bound to declare that I am not particularly starry-
eyed about the hearsay rule and am delighted that, in California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970), the Supreme Court refused to give it constitutional status. What is so
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(a)(4) which, in situations where the admissibility of the hearsay de-
pends on the identity of the speaker, makes the jury the judge of the
issue. 2 They can also be found in section 1222 which forces the judge
to let the jury hear an authorized admission on a mere prima facie
showing of authority to speak and, of course, in section 1223, relating
to admissibility of co-conspirators' statements.
great about a rule which provoked one English jurist to the following answer to an argu-
ment that certain hearsay was particularly reliable: "The question seems to me based
on the fallacy, that, whatever is morally convincing, and whatever reasonable beings
would form their judgments and act upon, may be submitted to the jury." Wright v.
Tatham, 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 566 (H.L. 1838) (Coleridge, J.). Nevertheless, as long as we
are going to have a hearsay rule and justify it by the need to protect unsophisticated
juries from unreliable gossip, it seems counterproductive to admit the gossip and let the
jury hear it, unless the court has made a prior determination based on all the available
evidence-not just a prima facie case-that the gossip is of the kind that a jury may
hear. Constitutional arguments aside, this is particularly true with respect to co-con-
spirators' declaratons. The orthodox rule is, of course, that the court determines with
finality whether the necessary foundation has been laid. If its finding is negative, the
jury will never hear the statements. If it is affirmative, they are admitted and stay
admitted. In People v. Brawley, 1 Cal. 3d 277, 290-91, 461 P.2d 361, 368-69, 82
Cal. Rptr. 161, 168-69 (1969), our Supreme Court said that the "California procedure
contains more safeguards for a defendant than the . . . (orthodox] procedure" because
the jury is given an opportunity to reject the statements. With all respect, I submit
that the advantage is illusory. There will be cases where the court and jury reach differ-
ent results on the preliminary facts. It seems safe to assume that a court would more
often exclude the confession than the jury because, first, the court does not necessarily
have to hear the statements before ruling on their admissibility and, second, even if it
does, it is supposedly better able to lay them aside when considering the foundational
facts. Turning to the cases where the court and the jury reach the same result, we find
that where it is exclusion, under the orthodox practice the jury will never have heard the
statement. If the result is inclusion in the body of evidence, the supposed safeguard will
not have been utilized by the jury. The "safeguard" thus benefits the party against
whom the statements are offered only in the rare case where the jury finds against the
foundational facts, but the court would not have done so. Against this speculative ad-
vantage, two factors must be balanced: 1) that the instruction to disregard the state-
ments may, as a matter of mental gymnastics, be impossible to obey, and 2) that such
cases are surely fewer than those where the court favors exclusion and the jury does not.
12 Section 403 provides:
(a) The proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of producing evi-
dence as to the existence of the preliminary fact, and the proffered evidence
is inadmissible unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sus-
tain a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact, when:
(1) The relevance of the proffered evidence depends on the existence of the
preliminary fact;
(2) The preliminary fact is the personal knowledge of a witness concerning
the subject matter of his testimony;
(3) The preliminary fact is the authenticity of a writing; or
(4) The proffered evidence is of a statement or other conduct of a particu-
lar person and the preliminary fact is whether that person made the
statement or so conducted himself.
(b) Subject to Section 702, the court may admit conditionally the proffered evi-
dence under this section, subject to evidence of the preliminary fact being
supplied later in the course of the trial.
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The Commission's "brief' for its position is found largely in its com-
ments to sections 403 and 405.13 Its stated reasons and cited authori-
ties for departing from orthodoxy are pitifully weak.
The comment to section 403 first states that "eminent legal authori-
ties sometimes differ over whether a particular fact question is one of
relevancy 14 or competency."' 5 The Commission then refers, as an ex-
ample, to a disagreement between Wigmore and Morgan. On inspec-
tion, that disagreement turns out to be a scholarly difference of opinion
on the question of whether admissions are received as an exception to
the hearsay rule-Morgan -- or as not being hearsay in the first
place-Wigmore.17  It is not explained what that particular dispute has
(c) If the court admits the proffered evidence under this section, the court:
(1) May, and on request shall, instruct the jury to determine whether the
preliminary fact exists and to disregard the proffered evidence unless the
jury finds that the preliminary fact does exist.
(2) Shall instruct the jury to disregard the proffered evidence if the court
subsequently determines that a jury could not reasonably find that the
preliminary fact exists.
13 For the procedure by which the Commission's statements were "adopted" by the
Legislature, see the background material at XXXV preceding § 1 of CAL. EviD. CODE
(West 1968) and the introduction at viii preceding § 1 of CAL. EvID. CODE (Deering
1966). Because the comments to § 403 and § 405 were changed in immaterial particu-
lars during the passage of the Code through the Legislature, they now appear as "Legis-
lative Committee" comments.
14 It is nit-picking at its worst, but one cannot help but wonder why in the text of the
Code the word is "relevance", while in the comment it is "relevancy".
15 Actually the Morgan-Wigmore dispute appears only in the reference to Wigmore.
The Morgan reference is to E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EviDENCE 244 (1957),
where, with respect to admissions, he states the orthodox rule which the Commission
rejects:
If a personal admission is an exception to the rule against hearsay, its admissi-
bility depends upon the identity of the declarant. If the statement was made by
the party against whom it is offered, it is admissible, otherwise not. Hence by
the orthodox rule, if there is a dispute in the evidence whether the offered state-
ment was made by the party or by another, the judge should determine the dis-
pute as a preliminary matter.
16 On the question I am considering, there is no essential difference between Wig-
more's and Morgan's views:
In more recent times, however, a heterodox practice has appeared, in places, of
leaving some questions of admissibility to the jury. No doubt the judge, after ad-
mitting evidence, leaves to the jury to give it what weight they think fit, for they
are the triers of the credibility and persuasive sufficiency of all evidence which is
admitted for their consideration. But to hand the evidence to them, to be re-
jected or accepted according to some legal definition, and not according to its in-
trinsic value to their minds, is to commit a grave blunder. It is an error of
policy (as well as a deviation from orthodox principle) for several reasons; in
the first place, it is a needless abdication of the judicial function--of which
humility we have already too much; furthermore, it adds another to the exceptions
to the general rules; and finally, it cumbers the jury with legal definitions and
offers an additional opportunity for quibbling over the tenor of the instructions.
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2550, at 502-03 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted).
17 Such an argument could be used to do away with the hearsay rule altogether for
the reason that for decades the favorite indoor sport of evidence teachers has been the
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to do with the preliminary fact problem.
Turning to hearsay, the comment to section 403 correctly declares
that, on occasion, the very relevance of a hearsay statement depends on
the identity of the declarant.18 The comment then proceeds to note
that, relevance aside, other preliminary facts must be proved to qualify
hearsay statements under the various exceptions. It is correctly noted
that as far as some of these exceptions are concerned-for example in-
consistent statements of a witness 9 and admissions-admissibility de-
pends on the identity of the declarant. Then, however, comes a non
sequitur. Having just stated that with respect to such statements ad-
missibility depends on identity, the comment confuses identity with
relevance:
Since the only preliminary fact to be determined in regard to these
declarations involves the relevancy of the evidence, they should be
admitted upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of the preliminary fact.20
This is nonsense. On D's trial for the murder of V, the statement,
"D murdered V" is relevant whoever made it.2 The Commission's as-
sertion is irreconcilable with an observation found later in the comment
writing of articles which explain to the profession that other evidence teachers do not
know how to define hearsay. See, e.g., Cross, The Scope of the Rule Against Hearsay,
72 L. Q. REv. 91 (1956); McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489
(1930); Morgan, Some Suggestions for Defining and Classifying Hearsay, 86 U. PA.
L. REv. 258 (1938); Rucker, The Twilight Zone of Hearsay, 9 VAND. L. Rnv. 453
(1956); Wheaton, What is Hearsay?, 46 IowA L. REv. 210 (1961).
18 The comment posits the following example:
[Ilf the issue is the state of mind of X, a person's statement as to his state of mind
has no tendency to prove X's state of mind unless the declarant was X. Rele-
vancy depends on the fact that X made the statement. Accordingly, if otherwise
competent, a hearsay statement is admitted upon evidence sufficient to sustain
a finding that the claimed declarant made the statement. CAL. Evm. CODE § 403,
comment at 37 (West 1968).
19 Inconsistent statements of a witness, under § 1235, are admissible on the merits
and not just for impeachment. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
20 CAL. Evm. CODE § 403, comment at 37 (West 1968) (emphasis added).
21 Maguire, in his delightful book entitled EvIDENCE--COMMON SENSE AND COMMON
LAw (1947), poses the following problem:
By the way, how should a trial judge operating along traditional lines handle a
case of objections for both incompetency and irrelevancy? An anonymous mem-
orandum, "I killed Cock Robin", is offered in the trial for murder of that no-
torious victim. The assertion is incompetent hearsay, and also irrelevant, unless
authorship by the defendant makes it his admission. Should the trial judge admit
the memorandum if there is enough evidence of such authorship to warrant a
favorable finding to this effect, or should he exclude it unless he himself finds
such authorship? Id. at 224-25.
I must differ that the proffered evidence presents a problem of incompetency and
irrelevance. Surely at the trial for the murder of Cock Robin, a confession is relevant
whoever made it. The only difference between "D killed V" and "I killed V" is that dif-
ferent factual conclusions are drawn by the jury if the declarant is someone other than
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with respect to prior inconsistent and consistent statements, admissible
on the merits under sections 1235 and 1236: "Moreover, the only
preliminary fact subject to dispute insofar as alleged inconsistent state-
ments are concerned is the identity of the declarant.12 2  This later ob-
servation, as the first one quoted, is entirely correct. A declarant's
statement, inconsistent or consistent with a witness' testimony, though
relevant, is inadmissible under the hearsay rule unless the declarant
happens to be the witness. Unfortunately, at this point the authors of
the comment had already persuaded themselves that identity and rele-
vance present the same issue.23  Therefore the comment proceeds il-
D. In this connection it should be pointed out that only a problem of relevance is pre-
sented where the dispute is whether the signature on a confession is that of D or whether
it is a deliberate forgery; no rational trier of fact would find a deliberately forged, con-
fession probative of the facts asserted therein. It should not even be necessary to in-
struct the jury not to base a guilty verdict on a confession which it finds to have been
written and signed by the arresting officer.
I cannot resist noting, at this point, that the Commission has, quite unnecessarily I be-
lieve, created a potential source for wholesale reversals, not yet fully appreciated by the
Bar. Section 403(c)(1) commands the court to instruct the jury, if requested, to disre-
gard evidence if the jury finds that necessary preliminary facts do not exist. Where the
relevancy of evidence depends on proof of some fact, the court's instructions on the sub-
stantive law should make such instructions quite unnecessary. If, in a will contest, the
jury has been properly instructed on testamentary capacity, what purpose does it serve to
tell it to disregard a claim of being the Queen of Sheba, unless it came from the mouth
of the testatrix? See note 18 supra.
22 CAL. EVID. CODE § 403, comment at 38 (West 1968).
23 Obviously, whoever drafted § 403 either loved redundancy or did not believe the
comment. If issues with respect to the identity of the declarants are only issues of
relevance under another name, § 403(a) (1), which hands such issues to the jury, was
unnecessary in view of § 403 (a) (4), which covers relevance.
I have a strong hunch that the reason for the identity-relevancy confusion is that § 403-
(a) (3) states specifically that questions concerning the authentication of writings are
for the jury. This subsection, too, is redundant. I cannot imagine a situation in which
the evidence which authenticates a writing will not also affect its relevance, which, of
course, may be very different from what the initial proponent of the writing had ex-
pected. Therefore, preliminary facts which affect authenticity are already covered by
§ 403(a)(1). But if the writer of a note blaming D's chauffeur for a collision with P
happens to be a bystander and not D, the writing, though still relevant, is inadmissible
under the hearsay rule. The Commission may have reasoned that since it is generally
the jury which must find whether the proponent of a writing has authenticated it, it must
be permitted to determine authorship on a mere prima facie showing that the author is
a person whose hearsay is admissible. From that premise it may then have been argued
that there should be no difference between written and oral hearsay. I agree that the
two deserve identical treatment, but disagree with the premise. The fact that the jury
generally determines authenticity simply does not support the proposition that it has
any function with respect to a writing which the court, on all the evidence affecting au-
thorship, finds inadmissible under the hearsay rule. Take the following hypothetical:
D is accused of shooting A and B. B was only slightly wounded and was never in fear of
death. A dies later, but the evidence on whether he was ever under a "sense of im-
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logically: "Hence, evidence is admitted under these sections upon the
introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the prelimi-
nary fact."24
When it got around to the comment to section 405, the Commission
discovered an additional rationale for its deviations. It writes:
When hearsay evidence is offered, two preliminary fact questions may
be raised. The first question relates to the authenticity of the proffered
declaration-was the statement actually made by the person alleged to
have made it? The second question relates to the existence of those
circumstances that make the hearsay sufficiently trustworthy to be re-
ceived in evidence-e. g., was the declaration spontaneous, the confes-
sion voluntary, the business record trustworthy? Under this code,
questions relating to the authenticity of the proffered declaration are
decided under Section 403. See the Comment to Section 403. But
other preliminary fact questions are decided under Section 405.25
Two observations are in order here. First, the new rationale does
not cover all the departures from orthodoxy. When a jury determines
whether an agent had authority to speak, whether a party could hear and
react to an accusation or whether a declarant spoke in furtherance of a
conspiracy of which he and a party were members, it determines ques-
tions that have nothing to do with authenticity of the statement. Sec-
ond, it is wishful thinking to believe that all fact determinations which
are to be made by the court relate to circumstances that make the hear-
say trustworthy. There are exceptions to the hearsay rule which de-
pend either on a professed inability of a witness to remember relevant
evidence26 or the unavailability of the declarant.27  A declarant is un-
available as a witness if he asserts a privilege not to testify.28 What is so
trustworthy about an unswor statement of a declarant who claims the
mediately impending death" is in conflict. Either A or B-another conflict-orally
accused D of the attack. Is it seriously suggested that while the question of A's state of
mind is for the court, the identity of the speaker is for the jury? What is the essential
difference between the two preliminary facts? If the answer is that A's state of mind
determines the trustworthiness of the accusation, but the identity of the speaker deter-
mines its admissibility under the hearsay rule, have we not gotten off the track some-
where if we entrust the determination of the former to the court and of the latter to the
jury?
24 CAL. Evm. CODE § 403, comment at 38 (West 1968).
25 Id. § 405, comment at 43.
26 Id. § 1237 (past recollection recorded).
27 E.g., Id. § 1230 (declarations against interest), § 1251 (statement of declarant's
previously existing mental or physical state), § 1291 (former testimony offered against
party to former proceeding), § 1292 (former testimony offered against person not a
party to former proceeding).
28 Id. § 240.
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Fifth Amendment? Further, unless one happens to believe that co-
conspirators' declarations in furtherance of some criminal scheme are
particularly trustworthy, the justification for that exception to the hear-
say rule is found in the law of agency and partnership.2 9
So much for the reasons given in the comments. The authorities on
which the Commission relies are no stronger. To claim that they
support the Commission is to display a sanguinity which, if necessary
to a position, would find support for Brown v. Board of Education in
Dred Scott v. Sanford.
ill
I now turn to those authorities. For the proposition that identity
equals relevance, the Commission cites Eastman v. Means.30  That was
an appeal from a case tried to the court, without a jury, on which it was
contended that a telephone conversation allegedly held between re-
spondent's father and appellant had been improperly admitted. The
father had called appellant's residence. The person who answered the
telephone "was addressed by the name of appellant"' and apparently
did not deny his identity. The court held that "this testimony was suf-
ficient prima facie to prove the identity of appellant with the person ad-
dressed and was properly admitted."3" Manifestly the stray use of the
words "prima facie" in an appeal from a court trial cannot be consid-
ered a holding that in a jury trial the identity of the person who an-
swered the telephone should have been submitted to the jury. In any
case, the court noted that appellant had admitted the conversations
when testifying in his own behalf.
It is on this slender reed that the Commission rests its claim that
identity questions are for the jury. Its next leap into heresy concerns
adoptive and authorized admissions.
Turning first to adoptive admissions, it is to be noted that to the
extent that the Code stands for the proposition that the jury deter-
mines whether the foundation for such admissions has been laid, sup-
port can only be found in the comment to section 403, not in the text.
Obviously it does not present a question of identity under section 403
(a)(4) whether the party who failed to react to an accusation was
conscious or asleep. Nor is there anything in the words of section
20 For the various rationales on which the admissibility of co-conspirators' state-
ments is justified, see Hearsay and Conspiracy, supra note 9, at 1161-67.
30 75 Cal. App. 537, 242 P. 1089 (1925).
31 Id. at 538, 242 P. at 1090.
32 Id. (citation omitted).
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1222, which states the rule of admissibility, that gives support to the
statement in the comment to section 403 that "adoptive admissions are
admitted upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a find-
ing of the foundational fact."33  The case cited by the Commission is
Southers v. Savage.34 In Southers the plaintiff's position was that he
was a passenger in an automobile driven by one McGuire which had
been sideswiped by Savage. Savage's position was that it was he who
had been sideswiped by McGuire. Evidence was offered that shortly
after the accident McGuire, in Southers' presence, admitted that he had
sideswiped Savage. Southers did not comment. There was a conflict
in the evidence with respect to whether Southers was or was not con-
scious at the time McGuire spoke. The appellate court held that the
trial court had properly left the determination of Southers' condition
to the jury and that, in any event, the conversation was admissible as, a
spontaneous statement" under the doctrine of Showalter v. Western
Pacific Railroad Company.36
It must be admitted that the court's language in Southers supports
the Commission. The case is, of course, weakened by the mention of
an alternative ground for admissibility. One can only wonder why the
Commission, which did not feel itself bound by People v. Gonzales,3 7
People v. Singh38 and People v. Keelin,39 threw analysis to the winds
when confronted with Southers.
40
33 CAL. Evm. CODE § 403, comment at 38 (West 1968). With respect to adoptive
admissions, the Commission's answer to the accusation that the Code's text does not
justify the comment would probably be a claim that the admissibility of such admissions
presents only a question of relevance. I would have to differ for the reasons already
stated. The offer of a policeman's detailed accusation against a suspect offers no
problem of relevance in a trial against the same suspect for having committed the crime
of which he had been accused. Even if it is conceded that the suspect was asleep, the
evidence of the officer's statement is still relevant hearsay. If the suspect is shown to
be conscious and able to deny the charge then, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
aside, he becomes the declarant and the hearsay is admissible.
34 191 Cal. App. 2d 100, 12 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1961).
35 Id. at 105, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
36 16 Cal. 2d 460, 468, 106 P.2d 895, 900 (1940).
37 24 Cal. 2d 870, 151 P.2d 251 (1944) (entrusting preliminary fact finding function
in cases of confessions to court and jury).
38 182 Cal. 457, 188 P. 995 (1920) (entrusting preliminary fact finding function in
cases of dying declarations to court and jury).
39 136 Cal. App. 2d 860, 289 P.2d 520 (1955) (entrusting preliminary fact finding
function in cases of spontaneous statements to court and jury).
40 Finally, one wonders whether Southers was not impliedly overruled by People v.
Briggs, 58 Cal. 2d 385, 408, 374 P.2d 257, 272, 24 Cal. Rptr. 417, 432 (1962), where
the California Supreme Court said:
But where there is some doubt as to whether the defendant was in a position to
hear the statements, understand them, or make reply, the question of whether his
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Turning to authorized admissions, the Commission felt that Sample
v. Round Mountain Citrus Farm Company41 supported its theory, em-
bodied in section 1222 of the Evidence Code, that a mere prima facie
case of authority to speak, even though disputed, makes the admissibility
of authorized admissions a jury question. Like Eastman, Sample was
an appeal from a court trial and the case is therefore, by its very nature,
impotent as a source of law applicable in jury trials. Furthermore,
even a cursory reading of the case demonstrates that the court was not
concerned so much with the admissibility of the admission of the par-
ticular agent, but with the substantive question whether the defendant
was responsible for that agent's negligence in permitting a' fire to
spread. Since the attack on the judgment was on the ground of insuf-
ficiency of evidence-no question of admissibility of evidence was even
raised-the court's statement that certain evidence "sufficed to make a
prima facie showing of the existence of the relation of principal and
agent"'42 cannot conceivably support a rule which puts the question of
admissibility into the hands of the jury.
This same confusion is apparently responsible for the retention, in
section 1223, of the rule of People v. Steccone,43 relating to co-con-
spirators' statements." After correctly noting that, in a suit by P
against D on a contract made by D's alleged agent A, the question of
agency must be left to the jury and, therefore, all evidence of negotia-
tions by A must be received on a mere prima facie showing of agency,
the comment to section 403 goes on: "The same rule is applicable when
a person is charged with criminal responsibility for the acts of another
failure to respond gave rise to an inference of acquiescence or guilty conscience is
a matter for the trial court to determine before admitting the testimony [citing
19 CAL. JuR. 2d, Evidence, § 401 at 143 (1953); People v. Davis, 43 Cal. 2d 661,
670, 276 P.2d 801, 805-06 (1954); People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 487, 229 P. 40,
55 (1924)].
However, the authorities cited by the court in Briggs make it doubtful that the court in-
tended its statement to be as broadly interpreted as it sounds. See also People v. Polk,
61 Cal. 2d 217, 231, 390 P.2d 641, 649, 37 Cal. Rptr. 753, 761 (1964). It is indeed diffi-
cult to determine just what preliminary facts, necessary before an adoptive admission can
be heard, are for the court. It is enough for present purposes to point out that the bold
statement in the comment to § 403, that all are for the jury, is incorrect and not sup-
ported by the language of the Code. See note 33 supra.
41 29 Cal. App. 547, 156 P. 983 (1916).
42 Id. at 549, 156 P. at 984.
43 36 Cal. 2d 234, 223 P.2d 17 (1950).
44 The part of § 1223 that retains prior law which makes co-conspirators' statements
conditionally admissible after mere prima facie proof is particularly surprising since
Professor Chadbourne, the Commission's consultant, specifically recommended change.
4 CAL. LAW REviSION COMM'N, REP., REc. & STuDIEs 301, 490 n.32 (1962).
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
because they are conspirators." 45 That is, of course, true as a matter
of substantive law. A conspirator is liable for co-conspirators' crimes
committed in carrying out the common purpose.46 Unquestionably
where the People seek to fasten such a crime on the defendant on trial,
they are entitled to offer such evidence on mere prima facie proof of
conspiracy. That, however, is not what we are talking about and cer-
tainly is not what the comment to the Evidence Code should be talking
about. We are not interested in co-conspirators' acts47 which make a
party substantively liable for a crime48 or the price of a bomb, but his
statements, which are otherwise inadmissible hearsay, from which the
jury is invited to infer some other fact.
Langley v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Company4"
is cited for the proposition that the identity of a hearsay declarant under
sections 1224 through 1227 is for the jury. No question of identity was
involved in the case. The only problem discussed was whether an ad-
mission by an insured with respect to jurisdiction over his person, on
which a judgment against the insured depended, was admissible against
the insurer in a suit on the judgment. The court held that the statement
was admissible, relying on former section 1851 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the predecessor of section 1224. Section 1851 read as fol-
lows: "And where the questibn in dispute between the parties is the
obligation or duty of a third person, whatever would be the evidence for
or against such person is prima facie evidence between the parties." 50
Obviously whoever drafted section 1851 did not for one moment con-
sider the problem of a dispute with respect to the identity of the declarant.
Schneider v. Market Street Railway Company5' is supposed to sup-
45 CAL. EviD. CODE § 403, comment at 36 (West 1968) (citation omitted).
46 People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 335, 92 P. 861, 863 (1907).
47 Many cases, including former § 1870(6) of the Code of Civil Procedure, say that
it is not only the declaration but also the acts of a co-conspirator which are admissible
only after proof of the conspiracy. This is an obvious overstatement. Where a co-con-
spirator's acts-as distinguished from his statements-are offered, no preliminary proof
of conspiracy is required as far as the hearsay rule is concerned. Unless the co-con-
spirator intends his conduct to be a substitute for words, the conduct is not hearsay.
Since conspirators traditionally do not conspire in public, in most cases the only evidence
available to prove the conspiracy will be the conspirators' conduct.
48 For example, D is being tried for soliciting the murder of V (CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 653f (West 1957)). It is the prosecution's theory that A, who actually did the
soliciting, did so as the agent of D. Undoubtedly a mere prima facie case of agency
will suffice to make the words of solicitation admissible.
49 219 Cal. 101, 104, 25 P.2d 418, 419 (1933).
5o Enacted 1872,.amended, ch. 383, § 217, [1873-741 Am. Code 380 (repealed ch.
299, § 48, [1965] Cal. Stat. 1350).
51 134 Cal. 482, 66 P. 734 (1901).
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port the proposition that questions of identity with respect to the maker
of a statement inconsistent with a witness' testimony are for the jury.
The defendant's motorman had testified that he could not tell whether
his car had come in contact with the deceased. He was impeached by
testimony given by one Glassman and one Hubbell to the effect that he
had said that he did strike the deceased. There was no question that
if the statement was made, it was made by Meley, the motorman. Nev-
ertheless the court, out of the blue as it were, said: "Whether the state-
ments made to Glassman and Hubbell were made by Meley, or by
some other man, was a question for the jury. '52 An obvious dictum.
Finally the Commission finds comfort in People v. Neely5" for its
belief that preliminary facts with respect to the admissibility of prior con-
sistent statements are for the jury. In that case, the appellant Golland
claimed that the trial court had improperly admitted two confessions
by Neely which implicated Golland and which had been made shortly
after Neely's arrest. Neely had been the People's witness at the trial.
He himself had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentence. Cross-ex-
amination had strongly suggested improper influence and "recent fab-
rication". The admissibility of the confessions was contested on the
ground that the motive to fabricate had been as strong at the time the
confessions were made as it was at the trial. Holding the confessions
admissible the court said:
In the present case the jury could properly infer from the questions
asked and the testimony given during the cross-examination of Neely
that owing to the promises of the district attorney, the motive to fab-
ricate did arise after the making of the two statements.54
Again the Commission raises a dictum to the status of law. The com-
plaint in Neely had not been that the time when the motive to fabricate
arose had been submitted to the wrong trier of fact-rather, the point
made was that the evidence of a recent motivation was insufficient as
a matter of law.
IV
Having proved, at least to my own satisfaction, that the Commis-
sion's authorities do not support it, where do we go from here? If the
people of California want to have a system in which the jury,55 before
52 Id. at 492, 66 P. at 738.
53 163 Cal. App. 2d 289, 312, 329 P.2d 357, 370 (1958).
54 Id., 329 P.2d at 371.
65 Or, perhaps, only each individual juror. Does the jury take votes on whether it
will consider certain evidence? In criminal cases must it be unanimous? What hap-
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weighing the evidence, may have to determine whether a statement in-
consistent with a party's trial position was made by him or someone
else, whether a truck driver who admitted liability had authority to
speak, whether a defendant was dazed or conscious while accusations
were being hurled at him, or whether a statement was or was not
made by one for whose "liability, obligation or duty" a party is re-
sponsible, that is, after all, their business. It ceases, however, to be
solely a matter of state concern if the application of such a system vio-
lates a federal constitutional right.
The only case of which I am aware in which the constitutionality of
one of our heretic practices has been called into question was People v.
Brawley.5 6 Whie it is a fine point whether it did so by a holding or
by mere dictum, unquestionably the court there said that it saw nothing
unconstitutional about the practice now enshrined in section 1223.
However the line of reasoning I want to suggest was not advanced by
counsel, whose attack was directed at section 1223 itself, rather than
at the judge versus jury problem which is the subject of this article.
Before developing the constitutional argument for what it is worth,
I must point to an awkward snag which developed a few short months
ago, long after the argument came to mind. Its central point is that
the submission of co-conspirators' statements on a mere prima facie
showing of the foundational facts violates the rule of Jackson v.
Denno5 7  Jackson of course, arose in the field of confessions and is
based on the premise that the introduction of an involuntary confession
deprives the defendant of due process of law. While that principle is as
valid today as it was then, it is the confrontation clause by which the rule
against hearsay gets its foot into the constitutional door. The United
States Supreme Court's recent opinion in Dutton v. Evans"' stands at
least for the proposition that under certain circumstances there is no
constitutional objection to Georgia's exception to the hearsay rule con-
cerning the use of co-conspirators' statements, which is far more lib-
eral as to admissibility than California's or the one generally enforced
by federal courts. Yet the upholding of the conviction in Evans was
based on several factors quite peculiar to that particular prosecution
and it seems a reasonable assumption that if none of those factors in
pens when the jury returns to the courtroom and the foreman announces that it stands
six to six on whether a minor company executive who had an accident during a business
trip and talked too much about it, had authority to speak?
56 1 Cal. 3d 277, 461 P.2d 361, 82 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1969).
67 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
58 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
[Vol. 4
1971] CALIFORNIA'S DEMOCRATIC EVIDENCE CODE
Evans appear in such a future case, at least one Justice would switch
sides"9 and the Supreme Court would hold that, absent proof of the
traditionally required foundation, a defendant's confrontation fights
have been violated.60 If I am wrong, what follows is an exercise in
nostalgia.
In Brawley the question of the proper procedure in admitting co-con-
spirators' declarations was raised by the court itself. After opening
briefs were filed the clerk of the court addressed a letter to the parties
which, at the court's request, posed several questions relating to co-
conspirators' statements. The second question read as follows:
In the light of cases such as Bruton v. United States, does the California
procedure relating to the receipt of evidence of an asserted conspirator's
extrajudicial declarations in furtherance of the conspiracy violate the
federal constitutional right of confrontation of another asserted con-
spirator? Assuming that it does violate that right, what procedure
should be employed in a retrial of the case?61
Counsel for the codefendant Baker-who was the party aggrieved by
the admission of three statements by Brawley to one Glaze-did not
interpret the question as inviting a discussion of the rule of People v.
Steccone.62 In his response he made the bold claim that under the rule
of People v. Aranda,68 nothing less than a severance was required. In
other words he not only claimed that a co-conspirator's statement was
admissible only against the declarant, but went further and suggested
that even a limiting instruction would not suffice.64
It is thus apparent that in Brawley the California Supreme Court was
never really asked to nullify the rule of People v. Steccone.6"
59 Evans is a plurality opinion. There were four dissenters. Justice Harlan agreed
with the result reached by the majority, but for reasons very much his own.
60 Evans, of course, has nothing to do with the problem of preliminary fact finding.
It only deals with the constitutionally permissible outline of the hearsay exception it-
self.
61 Letter from the clerk of the Supreme Court of California to the attorneys of rec-
ord, December 23, 1968.
62 36 Cal. 2d 234, 234 P.2d 17 (1950). See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
63 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
64 In answer to another question posed by the court, counsel did seem to concede
that if the co-conspirator, whose statement is admitted, testifies in his own behalf and
makes himself subject to cross-examination with respect to the statement, it may be re-
ceived.
65 In People v. Brawley, 1 Cal. 3d 277, 461 P.2d 361, 82 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1969), the
court could have done so without the need to declare § 1223 partly unconstitutional.
The trial had taken place before the Code went into effect and the applicable statute
[CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1870(6)] read as follows:
FACTS WHICH MAY BE PROVED ON TRIAL
247
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In Stein v. New York,6" the Supreme Court had approved the New
York practice under which the voluntariness of a confession was de-
termined by the jury if the evidence presented a "fair question of fact"
on the issue of voluntariness. 67  Under that practice the jury was later
instructed to disregard the confession if it found it to be coerced. What
the jury actually did never became known, since it only returned a
general verdict on the question of guilt. The New York practice came
again under attack in Jackson v. Denno.18 This time a bare majority
of the court declared it unconstitutional. The reasons it gave were
these: 1) Because of the general verdict, a reviewing court was unable
to determine whether the jury received or rejected the confession;09
2) There was no "assurance that the confessions did not serve as
makeweights in a compromise verdict, some jurors accepting the con-
fessions to overcome lingering doubt of guilt, others rejecting them
but finding their doubts satisfied by other evidence, and yet others
or perhaps all never reaching a separate and definite conclusion
as to the confessions but returning an unanalytical and impressionis-
tic verdict based on all they had heard";70 3) Since the jury is given both
the evidence which bears on the issue of coercion and the evidence
on the question of guilt, it may possibly find the confession to have been
voluntary because true;71 4) Even if it finds the confession to have
been involuntary, and thereafter theoretically disregards it, it may
nevertheless subconsciously resolve doubts on the question of guilt by
resorting to the confession.72
It seems plain that a reasonable argument can be made that some of
these considerations apply to California's procedure with respect to co-
conspirators' statements.
Let us first consider a criminal trial where the charged crime is
In conformity with the preceding provision, evidence may be given upon a trial of
the following facts:
6. After proof of conspiracy, the act or declaration of a conspirator against his co-
conspirator, and relating to the conspiracy.
Nothing in that statute compels a rule that it is the jury rather than the court, which de-
termines the sufficiency of the preliminary proof.
66 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
67 Id. at 172.
68 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
69 Id. at 379.
70 Id. at 380, citing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1953).
71 378 U.S. at 381.
72 Id. at 388-89.
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conspiracy. When the jury retires to deliberate it has heard non-hear-
say evidence pro and con on the existence of the conspiracy. Since we
must assume that the People made out a prima facie case on that point,
the court was of necessity forced to permit the jurors to hear co-con-
spirators' statements provided they were made in furtherance of and
during the conspiracy. These statements themselves must be relevant
on the question whether there was a conspiracy, or the People would
not have offered them. Theoretically the jury is now supposed to for-
get about the statements and look over the rest of the evidence to deter-
mine whether the statements should remain forgotten. Can we really
assume, however, that it is capable of performing that task, any more
than we can assume that a jury can forget the confession of one defen-
dant which the court has very properly declared to be inadmissible
against the other?73  In Brawley, Bruton was distinguished on the basis
that co-conspirators' statements are a recognized exception to the hear-
say rule. Of course, I fully agree and hope not to be misunderstood
to suggest otherwise. My point is rather that we may be using an un-
constitutional procedure in determining whether the prerequisites to
making co-conspirators' statements admissible have been met. Just as a
New York jury could improperly consider other evidence of guilt on the
question of the voluntariness of a confession, so may a California
jury be suspected of considering the co-conspirators' statements on the
preliminary question whether there was a conspiracy.74 Just as under
the condemned New York procedure, the general verdict tells us noth-
ing. We have no way of determining whether the jury reached its ulti-
mate finding of guilt by a bootstrap operation, in which it first, sub-
consciously perhaps, considered the statements themselves in determin-
ing their admissibility and then used them openly to determine guilt.
73 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which overruled Delli Paoli v.
United States, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), forbids joint trial in such situations.
74 In a conspiracy case it is difficult to carry the analogy to the New York confession
practice much further. If the jury rejects the co-conspirators' declarations, one would
suppose that in most cases the reason for the rejection is a failure to find the preliminary
fact of conspiracy to have been proved. At that point the defendant should be acquitted.
It is, however, conceivable that the jury may reject the evidence because it finds that the
declarant, as distinguished from the defendant, was not a member of the conspiracy,
that the statement was made after the conspiracy's termination or that it was not in fur-
therance thereof. The theoretically rejected statement may nevertheless be highly pro-
bative of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy and may, just as the the-
oretically rejected confession, help to resolve "lingering doubts about the sufficiency of
the other evidence." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 (1964). If the basic charge
is not conspiracy, the analogy is much closer. There, even if the jury rejects a finding of
conspiracy, and therefore, in theory, the statements, its task is not finished and the state-
ments not forgotten.
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It is thus entirely possible that in fact a defendant will be convicted on
nothing but inadmissible hearsay.
The matter is not much different if we posit a trial where the sub-
stantive charge is not conspiracy. Indeed, Brawley was such a case.
Brawley and his codefendant Baker were charged with and convicted of
the robbery-murder of a taxi driver. The statements involved were
made by Brawley to a fellow sailor, whom he informed of his and Baker's
plan to go "AWOL" and to commit robbery and murder. Independent
evidence was as follows: 75 1) The day before the murder Brawley and
Baker were seen talking together; 2) A few hours before the commis-
sion of the crime Brawley took a knife and wire from his locker, handed
the wire to Baker who said, "We won't need this now"; 3) Brawley also
took gloves from his locker. Both he and Baker put the gloves under
their clothing; 4) Shortly thereafter the two were seen heading toward
a bus stop; 5) They were arrested together in Illinois, at which time
Baker was in possession of the victim's wallet; 6) A knife which had
been in Brawley's possession was found near the victim; 7) The cause of
the victim's death was multiple stab wounds; 8) Brawley's finger and
shoe prints were found at the scene of the crime.
All this, was, of course, strong circumstantial evidence that Brawley
and Baker were both criminally responsible for the victim's death. It
was also strong evidence that they had committed the crime pursuant
to a preconceived plan-a conspiracy. Yet it is easy to imagine a
much weaker case because of the absence of some of the enumerated
items. Assume that the only physical clue at the scene of the crime is
Brawley's fingerprint. Assume further, that the only evidence-apart
from Brawley's statements-against Baker is the business with the
knife, the wire and the gloves, which preceded the murder by several
hours, and proof that he and Brawley headed toward a bus stop soon
thereafter. Although the case against Baker would then be an ex-
tremely weak one as far as the substantive crimes charged are con-
cerned, most courts would probably feel compelled to hold that a prima
facie case of conspiracy had been shown. Instead of receiving the
benefit of a court's immediate and conclusive ruling with respect to the
existence of a conspiracy-a ruling which might easily be in Baker's
favor-under section 1223 Brawley's statements have to be received
in evidence. The danger that the jury will consider them on the pre-
liminary question of the existence of a conspiracy is just as great as it
was in the case where the very crime charged is conspiracy. Only this
75 1 Cal. 3d at 284-85, 461 P.2d at 363-64, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64.
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time, after the question of the admissibility of the evidence is settled
against the defendant, the verdict will be murder and robbery.
VI
This point having been made, the question remains whether it is of
any importance. In all honesty I must admit to doubts on that score,
at least in a case where the defendants are actually charged with
conspiracy. The reason lies in the nature of that crime. In most cases
the prosecution must establish its case from scraps of evidence con-
cerning the activities of the alleged conspirators, from which an infer-
ence of the existence of the conspiracy arises. Naturally the defense
may have evidence that there never was any conspiracy. If the court
must rule with finality on the foundational facts before the prosecution
is permitted to offer co-conspirators' statements, it would of necessity
have to hear the evidence from both sides and, in effect, try the case
twice. Apparently in self-defense against such a prospect, there de-
veloped the rule that the court may, in its discretion, reverse the order
of proof and admit co-conspirators' statements before receiving any
independent proof of the conspiracy. 76 It would, of course, make no
sense to go only half way and force the prosecution to prove at least a
prima facie case before the first co-conspirator's statement is admitted;
the court would still not have all the evidence on which to base its ruling.
Therefore, even if the ultimate ruling on the admissibility of the state-
ments were reposed in the court, where it belongs, before that ruling is
made the jury will inevitably have heard the statements. In such a case
the only difference between the California procedure and the ortho-
dox rule is that, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury will be told that it
must forget the statements, rather than that it may do so.
7r
Yet this only proves that, for reasons rooted in the substantive law,
practical considerations sometimes may wipe out the benefits of the
orthodox rule.78 That there are occasions when a useful tool does not
work is no justification for discarding it altogether.
76 See, e.g., People v. Morales, 263 Cal. App. 2d 368, 69 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1968).
77 There is nothing inconsistent about the court's finding, on all the evidence, that no
conspiracy was established but nevertheless giving the case to the jury because, in the
court's view, a prima facie case has been made out.
78 The best known exposition of the manner in which the substantive nature of con-
spiracy impinges upon procedural safeguards, is Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949):
When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact of the conspiracy strategy.
Strictly, the prosecution should first establish prima facie the conspiracy -and
identify the conspirators, after which evidence of acts and declarations of each in
the course of its execution are admissible against all. But the order of proof of so
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VII
Admittedly, to desire structure for structure's sake is childish. If a
particular departure from orthodoxy is commanded by sound policy,
one should give it a try. However I find no cogent reasons for any of the
Commission's innovations, or for the error it retained in section 1223.
Undoubtedly a better sounding argument can be made for the
Code's idiosyncrasies than is contained in the comments to sections 403
and 405. A plausible claim can be put forward that, in certain situa-
tions, particularly where the preliminary fact is also a substantive is-
sue, the application of the orthodox rule deprives a litigant of the right
to trial by jury. I should like to have an opportunity to answer such an
assertion, example by example, if it is made. Suffice it for the present
that such an argument invariably puts the cart before the horse. The
proponent first determines-for insufficient reasons such as those ex-
pressed in the Code's comments-that certain preliminary facts should
be for the jury, and then defines the right of trial by jury to encompass
the erroneously expanded jury functions. Surely, the Founding Fa-
thers did not propose the Sixth and Seventh Amendments with the in-
spirations of the Law Revision Commission in mind.
sprawling a charge is difficult for a judge to control. As a practical matter, the
accused often is confronted with a hodgepodge of acts and statements by others
which he may never have authorized or intended or even known about, but which
help to persuade the jury of existence of the conspiracy itself. In other words, a
conspiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon assumption
that conpiracy existed. The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury, cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S.
539, 559 [1947), all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. See Skid-
more v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 [2d Cir. 1948].
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